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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EARL D. TANNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-vs.W. C. LAWLER and LAURA M.
LAWLER, his wife,
Defendant, and Appellants.
-vs.WALTER H. REICHERT,
Defendant and· Counterclaimant
as to Earl D. Tanner, and Plaintiff against George Beckstead as
Sheriff of Salt Lake County,
Utah, and Appellant
-vs.GEORGE BECKSTEAD, as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah
Defendant in Intervention,
and Respondent.

Case No. 8518

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal prosecuted by defendants., W. C.
Lawler and his wife, Laura ~f. Lawler, and by Walter H.
Reichert, defendant .and counterclaimant as to Earl D.
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T~anner

and plaintiff against George Beckstead as Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah, defendant in intervention.
The action was brought by Earl D. Tanner against the
Lawlers to recover posse~ssion of a home occupied by
the Lawlers and their three minor children and for damages because the Lawlers had refused to surrender possession thereof to Tanner. By leave of court obtained,
Walter H. Reichert was granted leave to intervene and
to make George W. Beckstead as Sheriff of Salt Lake
County, defendant in intervention. Pursuant to such
leave, Walter H. Reichert did intervene and did make
George W. Be·ckstead, as Sheriff of Salt Lake County,
defendant in intervention. After the pleadings were filed,
the parties stipulated what they deemed to be the controlling facts in the case, thus leaving for the determination of the court the law applicable to such facts. The
facts so stipulated are as follows:
The above-entitled action came on for trial before
this Court, sitting "~ifuout a jury, the Honorable David
T. Lewis presiding, this 24th day of February, 1956, the
plaintiff, E·arl D. Tanner, "~as present and the defendants, ,V. C. Lawler and Laura M. Lawler and Walter H.
Reichert \vere present by their counsel, Elias Hansen,
and tlH• defendant in interYention~ George Beckstead was
present by his counsel, D. F. ''Tilkins. The facts were
discussed and it \\"'as determined by all present that there
we):e no issues of fact ren1.aining in tl1is action, the facts
being agreed to be as follo'"~s, subject to any objections
to the n1aterialit.y the·reof:
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That for the purpose of this stipulation the plaintiff, Earl D. Tanner, will be referred to as the "plaintiff," the defendant and plaintiff in intervention, Walter
H. Reichert, will be referred to .as the "intervenor" and
the defendant in intervention, George Beckstead, Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, Utah, will be refe·rred to as the
"Sheriff." The exhibits of the intervenor which are attached to his Answer and Counterclaim and Complaint
in Intervention will be referred to by the exhibit and
reference adopted by the intervener in said pleading,
to-wit Exhibit "A," etc. The exhibit which is .attached to
the Reply and called therein Exhibit "A·" will be referred
to ·as Exhibit "P-1" and the Sheriff's Deed which is
attached to the original copy of this stipulation shall be
known as Exhibit "P-2."
1.

2. That at all times herein alleged up to December
21, 1955, the defendants, W. C. Lawler and Laura M.
Lawler, his wife, were in possession of the following
described tract of land, together with the improvements
thereon, located in Salt Lake City and County, State of
Utah:
Beginning at a point 40.85 rods West of the
Southeast ·corner of lot 1, Block 21, 10 Acre Plat
"A", Big Field Survey and running thence North
35.2 rods, more or less to the center of slough
ditch; thence .along the center of said slough North
48 ¥2 o West 7.1 rods to the West line of Lot 16
in said Block 21; thence South 29.8 rods to Southwe·st corner of said Lo t 1; thence E~ast 5.15 rods
to the point of beginning.
3. That the said vV. C. Lawler and his wife, Laura
1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
M. Lawler, during the times above mentioned occupied
the above described premises as their home for themselves and their three minor children.
4. That prior to the time W. C. Lawler and his wife,
Laura M. Lawler, ·acquired the above described tract of
land, James C. 1Iagana and his wife, Iva M. Mangana,
executed and delivered to the Pacific National Life Assurance Comp,any, a corporation, their promissory not~s,
one in the sum of $8,750.00 and the other in the sum of
$429.40, and rto secure the payment th~reof executed and
delivered to said Assurance Company a mortgage upon
the property above described; that after said notes and
mortgage were so executed and delivered, the mortgaged
property was conveyed by said James C. Magana and
Iva M. ~Iagana, his wife, to said \\7 alter H. Reichert,
intervener herein, who, together "\\ith his wife, Sylvia
Reichert, conveyed the said mortgaged property to W.
C. Lawler .and Laura M. La,vler, his "ife, as joint tenants, which deeds 'vere placed on record in the office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder. That in each of such
conveyances the grantee na1ned in the conveyance ru;sumed and agreed to pay the amount O\ving on the notes
and mortg.age given to secure the payment of the notes.
5.

' T·

That the said
C. La". ler and his wife, Laura
M. l.iR\vler, failed to pay the an1ount o\ving upon said
notes and 1nortgage and an action "~as brought by the
said I'acifie National Life Assurance Con1pany against
the said \\T. C. La,vler and Laur.a M. La"·Ier, his wife,
J ainHs (~. l\lagana and Iva 1\I. 1\Iagana, his "ife, the inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tervener herein, Walter H. Reichert and Sylvia Reichert,
his wife, to recover a ju,dgment for the .amount owing
upon the notes and to foreclose the mortgage upon the
above described property as against those obligated to
pay the notes and to foreclose the mortgage against them
and all of rthe other defendants who claimed an interest
in the mortgaged property.
6. That one of the defendants in said foreclosure
action was Paul Clowes, who is the assignor of plaintiff
Earl D. Tanne-r .of a judgment said Paul Clowes had
,against the defendant, vV. C. La.wler, which judgment
was, .and was alleged to be, a lien against the interest of
W. C. Lawler in the property above described. That by
the answer so filed by Paul Clovves above mentioned, he
sought judgment in said foreclosure action, Civil No.
103871, that the Court enter an order setting aside in
the order of S'ale the amount of the claim of P·aul Clowes
and that the same be paid to the said defendant, Paul
Clowes. That no judgmenrt or order was made· either in
favor or against the claim of the said, Paul Clowes.
7. That on June 1, 1955, a judgment was rendered
in the above entitled action by the above entitled court
in favor of the mortgagee, Pacific National Life Assurance Company, a corporation, and against the defendants, Lawlers, Mag.anas and Reicherts, for the
amount owing on the notes, and against all of the defendants, directing the foreclosure of the mortgage and
to apply the proceeds derived fr-om the sale to the notes.
8.

That on June 1, 1955, an orde·r of sale was issued
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and on July 5, 1955, the above described property was
sold by the Sheriff of S·alt Lake County, Utah, to the
Pacific National Life Assurance Company, ·a corporation,
for the amount owing upon the judgment, including costs
and attorney's fees, amounting in all to the sum of
$8,563.46.
9. Th·at on December 27, 1955, the above mentioned
W. C. Lawler made and executed a Declaration of Homestead which was filed for record and recorded in the office of the Coun~ty Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah,
on December 29, 1955, at 12:21 P.M., a copy of which
Declaration of Homestead is marked Exhibit "A" and
made a part hereof.
10. That on December 28, 1955, the intervener herein paid to the above mentioned Pacific National Life
Assurance Company the smn of $8,821.91, in consideration for which the said Pacific National Life Assurance
Company assigned to the Intervener the Sheriff's Certificate of S·ale hereinbefore n1entioned, a copy of wh'.ch
Assignment is marked Exhibit ~'B" and made a part
hereof. That the said assignment was duly recorded in
the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County,
Utah, on December 29, 1955, at 12:21 P.M.

11. That on Decen1ber ~9, 1955, the above mentioned
W. C. Lawler and Laura l\L La"~ler, his wife, made, exPented and delivered to the intervener herein a QuitClaim Deed, a copy of \\rllieh is marked Exhibit "C"
and made a part hereof, "~hich Quit.-C~lail11 Deed was
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recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt
Lake County, Utah on December 29, 1955 at 12:22 P.M.
12. That on December ·29, 1955, the intervener
served upon George Beckstead, the Sheriff of Salt Lake
County, Utah, copies of the foregoing Declaration of
Homestead, Assignment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale,
and Quit-Claim Deed; that attached to the Assignment
to the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was an affidavit by
the intervener herein, a copy o.f which is marked Exhibit
"D" and made a part hereof.
13. That on December 29, 1955, but subsequent to
the time the intervener gave the Salt Lake County
Sheriff notice of the Assignment from Pacific National
Life Assurance Company to the intervener of the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale of the property concerned in
this action, plaintiff served on George Beckstead, Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, a N o'tice of Intention to Redeem,
a certified copy of the docket of the judgment under
which he claimed the right to redeem, and an Affidavit
showing the amount then actually due on the judgment
lien under which he redeemed, copies of which are made a
part hereof as Exhibits "E", "F" and "G", together with
an Assignment properly acknowledged and proved, a
copy of which is made a part hereof as Exhibit "P-1", and
a cashier's check in the amount of $9,078.81 p~aid to said
George Beckstead for Wa~ter H. Reichert as Assignee
of the said Sheriff's Certificate of Sale.
14. That on December 29, 1955, at 4 :17 p.m., plaintiff filed for record in the office of the Salt Lake. County
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Recorder, a Certificate of Redemption of the property
concerned in this action, a copy of which is made a part
hereof as Exhibit "H."
That on December 30, 1955, at 9 :21 a.m. the
plaintiff recorded the Assignment, Exhibit "P-1," at the
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
15.

That thereafter plaintiff paid the delinquent
taxes on the property concerned in this action in the
amount of $424.99 and paid fire insurance premiums in
the amount of $58.97 and filed for record in the office
of the Salt Lake County Recorder a Notice of Payment
of Taxes and Fire Insurance.
16.

John W. Lowe, attorney for Pacific National
Life Assurance Company, prepared and tendered to the
intervener a Certificate of Redemption for the intervener
to redeem the above describd property from the Sheriff's
Sale. The intervener telephoned his attorney and advised
him of this fact and, upon advice of his attorney, the
intervener instead requested and obtained the Assignment which is made a part hereof as Exhibit "B."
17.

That the defendant, ,,.... C. La,,ler and the intervener had actual kno,vledge on Deee1nber 28, 1955
that the plaintiff "Tas interested in redeeming the property concerned herein, ltaving been so advised by John
W. Lowe, attorney for Pacific National Life Assurance
Comp·any, a corporation.
18.

19. Since Deren1ber 29, 1955, the intervener has
had possession of the ,above described prenrise·s by and
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through the defendants, W. C. Lawler and Laura M.
Lawler, who claimed and still claim to be the tenants
of the intervener, and the intervener refused and refuses
to surrender the possession of said premises to the plaintiff.
20. On or about January 19, 1956, plaintiff gave
defendants notice to quit, requiring defendants to vacate
the above described premises within seven days from
the service of said notice, and had the same served in
the manner provided by law.
21. More than seven days have elapsed since the
service of such notice, and the defendants have failed and
refused to quit the above described premises and surrender the same to plaintiff.
22. The fair rental value of the above described
property is $100.00 per month.
23. That on May 18, 1955, the intervener recovered
judgment in this Court against the defendant, W. C.
Lawler, for the sum of $3,640.00 principal and interest,
$364.00 attorney's fees, and $13.20 costs and that no part
of that judgment had been paid prior to the time that
the Lawlers gave to Reichert the deed which is referred
to herein as Exhibit "C."
24. That on January 20, 1956, the intervener herein
filed a Petition in Civil Cause No. 103,871 wherein and
whereby he sought to secure from this Court an Order
to Show Cause directing that the plaintiff herein, Earl
D. Tanner, and defendant in intervention, George BeckSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stead, as Sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah, appear before this Court on January 27,1956, and show cause why
an order should not be made vacating and setting aside
a Certificate of Redemption and Sheriff's Deed to the
property here involved and restraining said George
Beckstead and Earl D. Tanner from interfering with the
persons in the possession of the said property. That
service of the Order to Show Cause was had on the
plaintiff herein and the said Sheriff of Salt Lake County.
That on J anu~ary 26, 1956, The Order to Show Cause was
ex parte vacated and set aside on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. That thereafter the intervener herein filed
a motion in cause No. 103,871 wherein and whereby he
seeks an order of this Court vacating the above mentioned order of January 26, 1956, and to grant the relief
prayed for in the Order to Show Cause made and entered
on January 20, 1956. That notice ''as given that the motion to vacate the order of January 26, 1956, be vacated
and the relief prayed for in the Order to Show Cause
made on the 20th day of January, 1956, would be called
up for hearing before this Court at the same time that
the hearing "~ouJd be had in tl1e above entitled cause, all
of which more fully appears in the files in Civil Cause
No. 103,871 filed in this Court.
An an1endinent was n1ade to the Stipulation, which
reads as follows :
For the reason that paragraph 17 of the
Stipulation of Facts does not adequately set out
the details of the facts pertinent to the subject
thereof, it is requested by the plaintiff that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Stipulation of Facts herein be amended to include
the following:
"25. On February 17, 1956, the deposition of
the intervener, Walter H. Reichert, was taken and
the following questions were put and the following
answers given, and the answers given truly represent the facts to which they pertain:

"Q. * * * (Mr. ~Panner) Mr. Lowe prepared
certain papers for the purpose of redeeming the
property in your name, did he not~
"A. (Mr. Reichert) Well, I told him I
wanted an assignment of the interest, and he made
a redemption, that I didn't understand the difference. So he made a redemption, and after it was
done, we had all the p.apers signed by Pacific
National and taken down to the Sheriff.
"And Mr. Lowe said, 'You better call Mr.
Hansen, we want this done right.' I said, 'That
is just the way we "'\vant it, and so I will call Mr.
Hansen and make sure.'
"And I called Mr. Hansen, and he said, 'It
is the assignment we wanted, Walter, and not the
redemption,' I said, 'O.K., so we will start over
again.'
"So Mr. Lowe went up and prepared the assignment from Pacific N.ational to me, and I took
it over to the office and had the President sign
the seeond set of papers, Mr. Peterson, President
of Pacific National I~ife Assurance Company.
Then I took those papers down to the Sheriff and
left them with the Sheriff-stapled them together,
left them at the Sheriff's office, and had the
papers-left them at the County Recorder's Office."
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A copy of the declaration of homestead referred to
in the stipulation is attached to the Answer and Counterclaim of Walter H. Reichert as Exhibit A (R. 22). A
copy of the assignment of the Certificate of Sale by the
Pacific National Life Assurance Company referred to
in the stipulation is attached to the Answer and Counterclaim of Walter H. Reichert as Exhibit B. (R. 23).
The Quit-Claim Deed from W. C. Lawler and Laura M.
Lawler, his wife, is attached to the Answer and Counterclaim of Walter H. Reichert, as Exhibit C. A copy of
the Affidavit of Walter H. Reichert referred to in the
stipulation is attached to his Answer and Counterclaim
as Exhibit D. (R. 25). A copy of the Intention to Redeem by Earl D. Tanner, referred to in the stipulation is
marked Exhibit E (R. 26). A copy of the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment is marked Exhibit F. (R. 27). A copy of the Affidavit of Earl D.
Tanner referred to in the stipulation is marked Exhibit
G. (R. 29) A copy of the Certificate of Redemption referred to in the stipulation is marked Exhibit H. (R.
30-31). The Sheriff's Deed referred to in the stipulation
is attached to the stipulation and n1arked Ex. P-2 (R.
64) The fonn of the doc.un1ents above referred to are
in proper forn1 to accon1plish the results sought to be
accomplished thereby.
In addition to the stipulation there 'vas received in
evidence the files in the case of Pacif z~c }..Tational Life .Assurance Co1npany ,,_ Jan1es C. JJ;Jagana et al, the same
being the p~roceedings had in tl1e foreclosure of the mortgages held by the con1pany.
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In that foreclosure proceeding the Maganas, Reicherts, Lawlers, Paul Clowes ·and others were made defendants. It will be seen that Paul Clo,ves, the assignor
of Earl D. Tanner, the plaintiff in this action filed an
answer in the mortgage foreclosure suit in which he
alleged that he had ,a judgment against W. C. Lawler
for the sum of $1,555.48 "rith interest thereon and costs
in the sum of $14.20. Clo,ves prayed judgment that the
Court declare that he had a lien on the property described in plaintiff's con1plaint for the amount of his
judgment and that upon the sale of the property that the
amount owing to Clovves be set .aside to him. See Answer
of Clowes in mortgage foreclosure. (The pages of the
files are not numbered).
The Reicherts answered and prayed judgment that
if the property being foreclosed did not sell for sufficient
to pay the mortgage and the Reicherts were required to
pay any part of the amount owing on the mortgage that
they have judgment .against the Lawlers for the same.
(See answer of Rei cherts in the foreclosure proceeding.)
The Lawlers also answered in which they denied a
number of the allegations contained in the con1plaint,
and prayed judgment that the mortgage be not foreclosed.
(See answer of the Lawlers in the mortgage foreclosure
proceeding.)
None of the ans,wers contain numbers of the pages.
No relief was granted any of the defendants. The
plaintiff was granted judgment as prayed. The property
was bid in at the Sheriff's Sale for the amount of its
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judgment and a Certificate of Sale was issued by the
sheriff to the plaintiff, P·acific National Life Assurance
Company, a corporation.· The other facts that are deemed
material to a decision of this case are contained in the
stipulation heretofore set out in full in this brief.
The appellants contend that the Court below erred
in the following particulars :

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
:THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD: THAT
WHEN WALTER H. REICHERT PAID TO THE PACIFIC
NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY THE AMOUNT
OWING TO IT AND RECEIVED AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE
CERTIFiiCATE OF SALE, TOGETHER WITH A DEED FROM
THE LA WLERS, THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND ALL RIGHTS TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY CAME TO AN END.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD: THAT
THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS WITHOUT AUTH,ORITY TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY HERE
INVOLVED TO EARL D. TANNER OR ANY PERSON WHO
SOUGHT TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY OTHER THAN
WALTER H. REI·CHERT AT THE TIME HE GAVE MR.
TANNER THE SHERIFF'S DEED.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD: THAT
THE DEFENDANT W. C. LAWLER HAVING MADE AND
RECORDED A DECLARATION OF HOMESTEAD BEFORE
EARL D. TANNER SOUGHT TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY
HERE INVOLVED, THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
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WAS WITHOUT AU-THORITY T·O GIVE EARL D. ·T-ANNER
A DEED TO THE PROPERTY \VITHOUT EARL D. TANNER
PAYING THE SUM OF $3650.00 IN ADDITION T·O THE
AMOUNT THAT WALTER H. REICHERT HAD PAID TO
THE PACIFIC NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
FOR THE CERTIFI:CATE OF SALE, PLUS 3%.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HO·LD: THAT
THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS WITHOUT
AUTHORITY TO CONVEY TO EARL D. TANNER THE
INTEREST O·F LAURA M. LAWLER IN AND TO THE
PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED.

POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A MONEY
JUDGMENT AGAINST WALTER H. REICHERT.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A MONEY
JUDGMEN:T AGAINST THE LAWLERS AND IN AWARDING
TO EARL D. TANNER THE RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY
HERE INVOLVED.

POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER
SET ASIDE THE DEED OF THE SHERIFF TO EARL D.
TANNER AND LIKEWISE IN FAILING TO DIRECT THE
SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUN'TY TO EXECUTE AND
DELIVER A PROPER DEED TO WALTER H. REICHERT.

ARGUMENT
It will be seen that there is in the files of the mortgage foreclosure proceeding brought by the Pacific N a~
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tional Life Assurance C-ompany a petition of Walter H.
Reichert to make Earl D. Tanner and the Sheriff of
Salt Lake County parties to that action. In that petition
the procedings had up to the time of the issuance of the
sheriff's deed are set our in detail. Pursuant to said
Petition and a Motion of Walter H. Reichert, the court
issued an Order directed to Earl D. Tanner and the
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, to show cause why, among
other matters, the Sheriff's Deed to Tanner should not
be set aside. The Order to Show Cause was returnable
on January 27, 1956. On the day before the Order to
Show Cause was set for hearing, the Court, upon application of Earl D. Tanner and William T. Thurman
and without notice to counsel for Reichert, directed the
Order to Show Cause theretofore issued set aside because of lack of jurisdiction to issue the same. These
proceedings will be found in the files in the mortgage
foreclosure proceedings, but it is not possible to further
designate the san1e because the pages of the files in the
1nortgage foreclosure proceedings are not numbered.
We believe that the Court ''Tas in error in holding
that it \vas \Yithout jurisdiction to hear and determine
the 1natters sought to haYe deter1nined in the mortgage
foreclosure proceedings. Payson EJ~change Bank v.
Tietjen, 63 Utah 3~1, 2~5 Pae. 598; [;"Ttalz B·uilders Supply
Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 250, 39 Pac. (:2d) 329.
have
not proseeuted an appeal fro1n that order because the
respondents have secured .an order of the court below that
it was without jurisdiction to hear the 1natters \Yhich we
sought to have heard in the 1nortg'age foreclosure pro-

' ;e
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ceedings. So also no claim was made in the present case
that the appellants herein should have pursued by appeal
or otherwise the proceedings commenced in the mortgage
foreclosure case. Under such a state of facts the respondents may not now be heard to claim that appellants should
have proceeded further in the mortgage foreclosure suit
to secure the relief which they are hereby seeking. We
direct this matter to the attention of the. court to avoid
any confusion resulting from the presence of the pleadings in the mortgage foreclosure suit \vherein the same
relief was sought as is here sought.

POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD: THAT
WHEN WALTER H. REI•CHERT PAID ·TO THE PACIFIC
NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY THE AMOUNT
OWING TO IT AND RECEIVED AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF SALE, TOGETHER WITH A DEED FROM
THE LA WLERS, THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS AND ALL RIGHTS TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY CAME TO AN END.

Rule 69 (f) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Property sold subject to redemption, or any
part sold separately may be redeemed by the following persons or their successors in interest:
(1) the judgment debtor, (2) a creditor having a
lien by judgment or mortgage on the property sold,
or on some share or part thereof, subsequent to
that on which the property was sold."
Rule 69 (f) (5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
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"If no redemption is made within six months
after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is
entitled to a conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no other redemption by a creditor has been made and notice
thereof has been given, the last redemptioner, or
his assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the
expiration of six months after the sale. If the
judgment debtor redeems, he must make the same
payments as are required to effect a redemption
by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of
the sale is terminated and he is restored to his
estate."
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-2 provides:
"When a homestead is conveyed by the owner
thereof, such conveyance shall not subject the
premises to .any lien or encumbrance to which it
would not be subject in the hands of the owner:
and the proceeds of the sale thereof to the amount
of the exemption existing at the time of sale shall
be exempt from execution or other process for
one year after the receipt thereof by the person
entitled to the exemption."
It will be seen fron1 the facts as stipulated in this
case that Walter H. Reichert paid to the Pacific National
I.~ife Assurance Company, a corporation, the money owing to it as the purchaser of the property here involved
at the foreclosure proceeding and that he had the assignment of the certificate of sale. He thus fully complied
with the provisions of Rule 69 (f) (5) as to the payment
of the required amount of n1oney.
It will also be seen that by the Lawle·rs having conveyed to W·alter H. Reichert the property· here involved,
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he acquired all of the rights of the L-awlers as is provided in U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-2. So also will it be noted that
by the provisions of Rule 69 (f) (1) the successor of the
Lawlers (that is Walter H. Reichert), stands in the same
position as would the Lawlers have been in if they had
not made the conveyance of the property to Walter H.
Reichert. It will be noted that Walter H. Reichert had
received the assignment of the certificate of sale and the
deed from the Lawlers before E.arl D. Tanner made the
attempt to redeem the property; that the respondents
herein had actual notice of such facts and the deed to
the property was placed of record in the office of the
County Reeorder of Salt Lake County before Earl D.
Tanner parted with any money in an attempt to redeem
the property and likewise before Tanner served his notice of intention to redeem on the Sheriff of Salt Lake
County.
It is apparently claimed by the respondents that because Reichert requested an assignment of the certificate of sale inste.ad of following the usual procedure of
a redemption that he has forfeited his right to insist
that "the· effect of the sale is terminated and he as the
successor of the Lawlers is restored to his estate." We
confess our inability to grasp the significance of such a
claim. While the definition of the adjudicated cases
differ slightly in the definition given the word redeem
when applied to property subject to a mortgage or other
encumbrance, the word means to liberate from such mortgage or other encumbrance. 76 C.J.S. p·p 175-176 and
cases eited in foot notes. A1nong the cases cited in the
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foot note is Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Gailey,
143 Pac. (2d) 283, 105 Utah 519, where there is a discussion of the meaning of the word redeem. It is there
said that the word redeem is usually associated with the
regaining of some property which has been pledged to
secure an obligation, but which literally means regain,
repurchase or repay back. When Walter H. Reichert
secured the title to the real property and the certificate
of sale, he redeemed the property from the claim of the
Pacific National Life Assurance Company. It is difficult to see how the respondents can be heard to complain
because an assignment of the certificate of sale was
taken rather than some other document. The difficulty
that respondents are in is not on account of the manner
employed to acquire the claim of the X ational Life Assurance Company, but is because \\. .alter H. Reichert,
after having received a conveyance from the Lawlers had
all of the rights that the La"·lers would ha\e had if they
had not made the conveyance. It is expressly so provided
in the statutes and rules above quoted.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD: THAT
THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO CONVEY THE PROPERTY HERE
INVOLVED TO EARL D. TANNER OR ANY PERSON WHO
SOUGHT TO REDEEM THE PROPERTY OTHER THAN
WALTER H. REI·CHERT AT THE Til\;lE HE GAVE MR.
TANNER THE SHERIFF'S DEED.

Rule 69 (f) (4) of the TJtah Rules of Civil Procedure
p,rovides:
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"If the property is redeemed by a creditor,
any other creditor having a right of redemption
may, within 60 days .after the last redemption and
within six months after the sale, redeem the property from such last redemptioner in the same
manner as provided in the preceding subdivision,
upon paying the sum of such last redemption, with
three per cent thereon in addition. . . . and, in
addition, the amount of any lien held by such
last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest."
Rule 69 (f) (5) provides:
"If no redemption is made within six months
after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a conveyance·; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no other redemption by a creditor has been made and notice thereof has been given, the last redemptioner, or his
assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed at the expiration of six months after the sale."
If effect is given to the language "whenever sixty
days have elapsed and no other redemption by a creditor
has been made and notice thereof has been given," etc.
it would follow that sixty days must elapse from the date
of the last redemption before a sheriff's deed may be
given. There is some ambiguity when the language of
Rule 69 (f) ( 4) and 69 (f) (5) is considered, but we
believe that to make sense and give effeet to the intention
of the legislature or the rule making authority the language must be construed to mean that in any event sixty
days must elapse after a creditor makes a redemption
before a sheriff's deed may issue. We say that·because
to give any other construction might well lead to a grave
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injustice. To illustrate. In this case, Walter H. Reichert
had an unpaid judgment against the defendant, W. C.
Lawler. Supposing he had made a redemption of the
property here involved on the last day of the six months
from the date of the foreclosure s·ale, and then immediately after su:ch redemption Mr. Tanner had exercised
his claimed right to redeem on account of the judgment
which was assigned to him being prior in time to the
judgment held by Mr. Reichert. In such case any right
of redemption that may have been exercised by reason
of the judgment held by ~Ir. Reichert would be inferior
to and must yield to the prior right and even if Mr.
Reichert in such case had been willing to redeem from
the Clowes judgment, he may well not be able to do so
because of lack of time to raise the additional money or
because he was not informed of the redemption of the
holder of a prior judgment. Such a situation would be
in great part obviated by so construing the statute that
sixty days must elapse after the last redemption before
a sheriff's Deed may issue. However, the facts in this
case, as we understand the la'v to be, does not make it
necessary
. to construe the la"~ and rules so that sixtt. days
1nust elapse after the last rede1nption of a creditor before a sheriff~s Deed nu1y issue, and therefore, ""'"e shall
not further discuss tins phase of the case.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD: THAT·
THE DEFENDANT W. C. LAWLER HAVING MADE AND
RECORDED A DE,CLARATION OF HOMESTEAD BEFORE
EARL D. TANNER SOUGHT TO REDEEM ·THE PROPERTY
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HERE INVOLVED, 'THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO GIVE EARL D. TANNER
A DEED TO THE PRO·PERTY WTTHOUT EARL D. TANNER
PAYING 'THE SUM OF $3650.00 IN ADDITION TO THE
AMOUNT THAT WALTER H. REICHERT HAD PAID 'TO
THE PACIFIC NATIONAL LIFE AS.SURAN1CE CO·MP.ANY
FOR THE CERTIFI,CATE OF SALE, PLUS 3%.

It will be seen from the stipulation of the facts in
this case that the defendant, W. C. Lawler, executed and
had placed of record a homestead declaration as provided by U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-10. That the respondent
sheriff was notified thereof that such recordation and
notification was had before the respondent Earl D. Tanner notified the respondent sheriff that he, Tanner, intended to redeem the property here involved.
Article 22, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah
provides:
"The Legislature shall provide by law, for the
selection by each head of a family, an exemption
of a homestead, which may consist of one or more
parcels of land, together with the appurtenances
and improvements thereon of the value of at least
fifteen hundred dollars, from s.ale or exe'cution."
U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-1 provides:
"A homestead consisting of lands, appurtenances and improvements, which lands may be in
one or more localities, not exceeding in value with
the appurtenances and in1provements thereon the
sum of $2,000.00 for the head of the family, and
the further sum of $750.00 for the spouse, and
$300.00 for e.ach other member of the family, shall
be exempt from judgment lien and from execution
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or foreed sale, except upon the following obligations: (1) Taxes accruing and levied thereon;
and (2) judgments obtained on debts secured by
lawful mortgage on the premises and on debts
created for the purchase price thereof."
U.C.A., 1953, 28-1-10 provides:
"The homestead must be selected and claimed
by the homestead claimant by making, signing and
acknowledging a declaration of homestead as provided in section 28-1-11, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, which declaration must, before the time
stated in the notice of sale on execution,
or on other judicial sale, as the time of sale, of
premises in which the homestead is claimed, be
delivered to and served upon the sheriff or other
officer conducting the sale or recorded as provided
in section 28-1-12, L_itah Code Annotated, 1953.
If no such claim is filed or served as herein provided, title shall p·ass to the purchaser at such sale
free and clear of all homestead rights."
Prior to the enactn1ent of l""".C.~-1. 1953, 28-1-10 in
1947, the la,,~s of Utah dealing \Yith homesteads as construed by this Court "~ere extre1nely liberal in protecting
homeste.ad rights. Daniels z-. Snlifh. 51 Utal1l±±, 169 Pac.
267; Panagopu1os v. illanninp. 93lTtah 198,69 Pac. (2d)
61~; Gigliotti r . ..Jlbergo. 100 Utal1 392, 115 Pac. (2d)
791; Payson Exchange Sav. Bank t'. Tietjen, 63 Utah
321, 225 Pac. 598; Bell v. Jones, 104 Utah 306, 139 Pac.
(2d) 884; Utah Buiders Supply Co. r. Gardner, 86 Utah
250, 253, 39 Pac. ( 2d) 3~7: 103 A.L.R. 928; In re ltfower's
Estate, 93 Utah 390, 73 Pac. (2d) 967; Stuki v. EUis, 114
Utah 486, 201 Pac. (2d) 486; Willianls v. Peterson, 86
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Utah 526, 46 Pac. (2d) 674, In re Dalton's Estate, 109
Utah 508, 167 Pac. (2d) 690.
It will be seen that in such cases .as Payson Exchange
Sav. Bank v. Tietjen and Utah Builders Supply Co. v.
Gardner, supra, it is held that a sale of a homestead
is void and may be attacked either in the proceeding in
which the sale is had or in another action.
In the ease of Kimball v. Lewis, 17 Utah 381, 53 Pac.
1037 it is said at page 392 of the Utah report that:
"By the provision of this statute (a statute
in substance the same as U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-1) the
homestead exemption is not a privilege conferred
upon the head of the family, hut an absolute right.
It was intended to secure and prote:ct the home
against creditors and as a means of support to
every family in the state. No waiver of the
homestead right could effect the interest of the
wife and children therein....
"If the premises owned or occupied by the
debtor are exempt from execution without any
necessity on the part of the debtor to formerly
select them as a homestead, and any sale thereof
upon execution will not affect the title to such
exempt homestead, or deprive the actual owner or
occupant thereof of his homestead rights therein.
In such a case, the selection of a homestead by
the judgment debtor is sufficiently manifest by
the fact of his ownership, residence, use or occupation as such and a sale thereof under execution
may be set aside as a cloud upon the title."
So far as we are able to ascertain the case of Kimball v. Lewis, supra, has not been modified or reversed
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by any of the numerous subsequent decisions of this
court dealing with the matter of homestead exemption,
but on the contrary the principles of law therein announced have been amplified by the later decisions.
Apparently the respondents claim that because of
the provisions of U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-10 the Lawlers may
not successfully maintain the claim of a homestead
against the claim of Tanner. The difficulty with such
claim is that Tanner does not come within its provisions.
He was not the purchaser at the sale of the property
\vhich he claims freed the property from the homestead.
Before Tanner sought to redeem the property, W. C.
Lawler had selected the property by making, signing
and acknowledging a declaration of homestead as provided by Section 28-1-11, U.C.A. 1953. So also had the
declaration of ho1nestead been placed of record in the
Office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County prior
thereto, and the sheriff of Salt Lake County had been
advised of such fact before Tanner made his attempt to
redeem the property by reason of the assignment to him
of the judgment of Paul Cowles.
It will be noted that by the provisions of U.C.A.1953,
28-1-10 it is provided that "the declaration of a homestead must, before the time stated in the notice of sale
on execution, or on other judicial sale, as the time of sale,
of premises in whieh the homestead is claimed, be served
upon the sheriff . . . or recorded ... " If we look only
at the provision of the Act just quoted and give it full
force, the Act would in many instances result in nullifying the provisions of Section 1, Article 22 of the ConstiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tution of Utah. Does the quoted language mean that the
right of a homestead is forever gone if the husband or
wife has not made the selection before the sheriff prepares and signs a notice of sale, or does it mean that
the moment the sheriff posts one or more of the notices
of s.ale that the right to claim a homestead is gone, or does
it mean that the homestead may be claimed up to the time
all of the required notices are posted and the required
publication is had and the paper in which it is published
has been distributed to its p~atrons. The answer to these
inquiries cannot be found in the act. We can understand that there is some basis for saying that a homestead is gone if the claimant of the homestead stands by
and permits someone to buy in his property and pay
therefor without asserting his claim of a homestead,
but it would seem unlikely that the law making power
intended that the owner of a homestead is forever barred
from claiming a homestead merely because he has not
made known his rights before the sheriff or other officer
has prepared and signed his name to a notice of sale.
The apparent and only justifiable purpose of the provisions of U.C.A. 1953 28-1-10 was to prote.ct a purchaser
who in good faith buys and pays for property at a judicial sale believing that he is acquiring a good title thereto
free from a homestead claim. It is difficult to believe
that the legislature intended to create a situation where
a speculator with full knowledge of a just claim of a
homestead should be permitted to deprive the wife and
children of a debtor to their right to a home as provided
by the constitution.
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It will be seen in this case that the Lawlers had no
occasion to assert a claim of a homestead right in the
mortgage foreclosure proceedings. Such a clailn would
avail them nothing by way of defeating the mortgage
foreclosure. They assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage when the property was conveyed to them. They
evidently knew that they would be unable to save the
home unless someone like Walter H. Reichert came to
their aid during the period between the time of the sale
and the expiration of the period of redemption. If the
position taken by the respondents is to be the construction given to U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-10 the right to assert a
homestead claim to the property foreclosed was gone
when the notice of sale was given.
A homestead right is obviously a property right.
In the case of a forec1osure or a sale under execution,
the owner has six months in which to redeem. Rule 69 (f)
(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If however
effect is given to U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-10 as " ..e understand
respondents' contention tl1at it should be construed, the
ho1nestead right 1nay not be suecessfully asserted after
the sheriff or other officer conducting the sale gives
the notice of sale.
e can understand ho".. the claimant of
a homestead 1nay be estopped fron1 n1alring such a claim
if he does nothing to infor1n a prospective purchaser of
his claim and such purehaser pays for the property in
the belief that he buys the property free fron1 the homeste·ad claim. However, if U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-10 is construed to me·an th.at a homestead right is gone forever
if not asserted before a notice of sale is given, such a

'r
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construction would result in a reve.rsal of the law heretofore repeatedly announced by this court and offend
against both Section 1, Article 22 and Article 6, Section
26 Subdivision 18 of the Constitution of Utah. There
' seem to be no reasonable basis for not .according
would
to a homestead right, at least the same protection that is
accorded to other rights in real estate, especially where
the purchaser is fully advised of the claim of a homestead.
In this connection the attention of the Court is directed to the fact th.at this Court has repeatedly and
uniformly held that possession of property is notice to
the world of the rights of the one in possession. Toland
v. Corey, 6 Utah 392, 24 Pac. 190; Neponset Land &
Livestock Co. v. Dixon, 10 Utah 334, 37 Pac. 573; Snyder
v. Murdock, 20 Utah 407, 418, 59 Pac. 88, Jordan v.
Utah Ry. Co., 47 Utah 519, 522, 156 Pac. 939; Federal
Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48 Pac.
(2d) 480. The stipulation of facts show that the Lawlers
and their three minor children resided on the property
here involved immediately prior to the conveyance to
Reichert. U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-2 provides that the property
when ,conveyed to Reichert was not subject to any liens
or encumbrances that did not exist when owned by the
Lawlers.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD: THAT
THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUN'TY WAS WITHOUT
AUTHORITY TO CONVEY TO EARL D. TANNER THE
INTERES'T OF LAURA M. LAWLER IN AND TO THE
PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED.
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It will be noted from the stipulated facts that the
defendant L·aura M. Lawler was a joint owner of the
property here involved with her husband, W. C. Lawler.
She was· such joint owner when the judgment was rendered in favor of Paul Clowes, the assignor of the plaintiff herein. The conveyance to the Lawlers was of record
in the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, which is
the county where the property is situated. The Lawlers
were in possession and used the property as their home
for themselves and their minor children at the time and
times here involved. It is so stipulated by the parties
herein. Nothing 'vas said or done by Mrs. Lawler to
lead anyone to believe that she was not a joint owner
of the property. Quite the contrary. Before plaintiff
sought to redeem the property, :Mrs. Lawler joined her
husband in conveying the property to Mr. Reichert, who
placed his deed on record before the plaintiff attempted
to redeem the property. K ot only that, but he took the
pains to inform the sheriff that he, Reichert, had acquired the property. There is nothing in the stipulated
facts or in the n1ortgage foreclosure "~hich shows or
tends to show that ~frs. Lawler or Mr. Reichert did or
failed to do anything "·hieh "·as calculated to lead the
plaintiff to belieYe that Mrs. La"·ler was not a joint
owner of the property here involved, subject, of course,
to the claiin of the n1ortgnge which claim was satisfied
wh0n l\J r. Reichert paid the mortgagee and secured an
assign1nent of the certificate of sale. The judgment of
!fr. Clowes that.was assigned to the plaintiff was against
!1r. La,vler, not Mrs. Lawler. Of course, if the clock
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could be turned back a few hundred years, authorities
might well be found that a wife is liable for the debts
of her husband. In light, however, of the provisions of
U.C.A. 1953, 30-2-1 and the modern authorities, it would
seem idle for plaintiff to contend that he acquired any
claim to Mrs. Lawler's interest in the property here involved by the purchase of the judgment which Mr. Clowes
acquired against Mr. Lawler.
In this connection it will be seen that Mr. Clowes by
his answer in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings
prayed judgment "that the Court, upon order of sale of
the property, shall set aside the amount set forth in paragraph 1 of this prayer and order payment thereof to
this defendant." So far as appears the Lawlers had no
notice of such answer, and in any event no judgment was
entered in favor of Clowes. If any legal results were
brought .about by such answer, it would be to defeat the
claim of Clowes by reason of the rule that "a judgment
is conclusive not only as to defenses set up and adjudicated, but also as to those which might have been raised."
Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, supra.
It is the uniform holding of the authorities that one
may not be deprived of his property without due process
of law. To constitute due process of law, there must be
"notice and opportunity to be heard, and to defend in an
orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case
before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause." 12
Am. J ur. 267, Sec. 273. In foot notes to the text above
quoted are numerous cases from state and federal courts
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including the Utah case of Denver & R.G.W. Railroad v.
Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 316, 279 Pac. 612. In
this case neither of the Lawlers had notice that the homestead rights of the Lawlers, which were conveyed to
Reichert, was to be adjudicated in the foreclosure proceedings or at all. The action to foreclose the mortgage
did not involve the homestead right of the Lawlers by
those who had a judgment against Mr. Lawler, much less
the rights of ~frs. Lawler. The judgment against Mr.
Lawler was not lien on his homestead right. It is so provided in U.C.A. 1953, 28-1-1. As heretofore indicated we
are at a loss to conceive of any principle of law that can
justify a conveyance of the rights of :Jirs. Lawler to the
plaintiff herein under the facts in this case. That being
so, \Ve shall forego any further discussion of this phase
of the case until ":--e ascertain the theory upon which
plaintiff makes such a claim.
POINT

··r·.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A MONEY
JUDGMENT AGAINST WALTER H. REICHERT.

Apparenly 'Valter .A... Reiehert is required to pay
the plaintiff the money judgn1ent a'varded him because
he, Walter H. R.eirhert, played the part of a good Samaritan by assisting the La\vlers to saye their home for themselves and their children. U. C.A. 1953, 78-36-3 provides
that one m~ay be guilty of unlawful detainer "in cases of
·tenancies .at will when the person remains in possession
of such premises after the expiration of a notice of not
les'S than five days." We assume that the plaintiff claims
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a right to recover because of the law just quoted. No
claim is or can successfully be maintained that Walter
H. Reichert w.as in actual posS'ession of the premises here
involved or that he was ever served with notice to surrender up the possession thereof, or that it was within
his power to force the Lawlers to surrender the possession, or even that he knew if any notice or demand
had been made on the Lawlers to surrender possession
thereof. The evils of permitting such a judgment to stand
is apparent.
A wife and minor children of a husband and father
who have judgments against the father such as in this
case, are .absolutely helpless to save their home unless
someone with a grain o£ the milk of human kindness is
willing to come to their aid. If they are to be penalized
by having a judgment rendered against them as was done
in this case, it may aid a modern Shylock to re.ap a handsome reward by letting it be known that if one dares to
interfere with the scheme to deprive the family of their
right to a homestead, and the right of the wife and
mother to insist on her rights in the property, then and
in such case the one so interfering may be required to add
to the profits of speculator. We can find nothing in the
law that supports any such results.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A MONEY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE LAWLER.S AN.D IN AWARDING
TO EARL D. TANNER THE RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY
HERE INVOLVED.
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Little need be said in support of this point. It may
be that the law may support the following: Th'at the
plaintiff redeemed the interest of W. C. Lawler in the
property for the money which he, the plaintiff paid to the
sheriff for the use of Walter H. Reichert, subject, however, to a claim of W. C. Lawler for an additional $3,650.00, the amount of the homestead. In such case the
interest of Mrs. Lawler would not be affected, and she
could not as a tenant in common be held to be guilty of
unlawful detainer. The appellants will not resist such a
result and on the contrary concede there may be merit
to such a disposition of this case.

POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ORDER
SET ASIDE 'THE DEED OF THE SHERIFF TO EARL D.
TANNER AND LIKEWISE IN FAILING TO DIRECT THE
SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY TO EXECUTE AND
DELIVER A PROPER DEED TO WALTER H. REICHERT.

In order to clear the title of Walter H. Reichert to
the property here involved, it is necessary for this court
to vacate and set aside the sheriff's deed to the plaintiff,
and either direct the sheriff of Salt Lake County, Utah,
to execute and deliver a sheriff's deed to Walter H.
Reichert or to enter a decree vacating and setting aside
the deed to E.arl D. Tanner as to the interest of defendant, Mrs. Lawler, and to further decree that the interest
and the only interest that Earl D. Tanner acquired by
reason of the conveyance to him is subject to a lien for
the sum of $3650.00, the S'ame being the amount of the
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homestead lien of the Lawlers in the intere·st acquired by
the plaintiff herein. It is submitted that such a judgment may be entered herein or if that may not be done,
the sheriff's deed to Tanner be set aside and that the
title of Walter H. Reichert is free from any and all
claims of Earl D. Tanner.

Respectfully submitted,

ELIAS HANSEN
Attorney for Appellants
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